We study experimentally how players learn to make decisions if they face many different (normal-form) games. Games are generated randomly from a uniform distribution in each of 100 rounds. We find that agents do extrapolate between games but learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. If either there are few games or if access to information about the opponents' behavior is easy (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case and play converges to a distribution of actions which is Non-Nash and which can be rationalized by theoretical models of categorization. Estimating different learning models we find that Nash choices are best explained by finer categorizations than Non-Nash choices. Furthermore participants scoring better in the "Cognitive Reflection Test" choose Nash actions more often than other participants.
Introduction
The theory of learning in games has largely been concerned with agents that face one well specified game and try to learn optimal actions in that game. In addition it is often assumed that the description of the game (players, strategies and payoffs) are known by all players interacting in the game. Reality, though, is much more complex. Agents face many different games and while they typically know their own preferences, they often do not know those of their opponents. In such cases while they will know the "label" of a game, they will not know the full strategic form.
An important question is whether and how in such a complex environment with many different games people extrapolate from games they have experienced to other strategic situations. For example, in a managerial trainee programm future executives are being prepared for reality by playing strategic games among each other. Of course, they are supposed to apply their experiences to those games they will later be confronted with in their professional life. In order to choose the appropriate games for a trainee programm it is important to know how exactly people extrapolate between games. As another example consider consumer behavior in everyday transactions. People will typically consider several strategic situations as similar since it comes at a considerable reasoning cost to distinguish all situations at all times. Knowledge on how people learn across such situations will have implications on contracts that firms offer to consumers and also might suggest regulatory interventions in order to impede exploitation of consumers by firms.
While there is a (small) number of theories about how agents extrapolate between different games (see the literature referred to below), there is little evidence on how successful those theories are in organizing or predicting actual human behavior.
In this paper we investigate experimentally how agents deal with complex situations involving many different games. In particular we study the implications of complexity (measured by the number of games and the accessibility of information) on learning and convergence to equilibrium in simple normal form games. In our experiment participants interact in 3×3 normal form games for 100 rounds. The number of games is varied across treatments. Agents know their own payoffs in each game, but not those of their opponents. In addition in some treatments explicit information about the opponent's past behavior is provided, whereas in others it is not. While we vary the complexity of the environment across treatments (by varying the number of games and the amount of information explicitly provided), the games themselves are simple. In particular they are all acyclic and have a unique strict Nash equilibrium that coincides with the maxmin prediction.
We find that participants do extrapolate between games, but learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. If either there are few games or if explicit information about the opponent's behavior is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case and play converges to a distribution of actions which is Non-Nash.
We then ask whether the data can be rationalized through a model where agents partition the set of games into categories of games and then (i) either choose the same action in all games in a category (action bundling) or (ii) form beliefs across all games in a category (belief bundling). Our first observation is that action choices that cannot be explained by theoretical models of either belief-bundling or action bundling are never observed, while choices predicted by these models are observed. Estimating different learning models we then find that models of categorization can explain the data well. Nash choices are best explained by smaller categories than NonNash choices. Furthermore participants scoring better in the "Cognitive Reflection Test" (Frederick, 2005) choose Nash actions more often than other participants. Some other authors have investigated similarity learning or analogy based decisions in experiments. Huck, Jehiel and Rutter (2007) let participants interact in two different normal form games varying the degree of accessibility of information about the opponent's behavior. They show that Jehiel's (2005) equilibrium concept of "analogy based expectations" can rationalize their data. Stahl and Huyck (2002) let participants interact in different 2×2 stag hunt games and demonstrate that similarity plays a role in the participants' decisions. Haruvy and Stahl (2008) let participants interact in 10 different normal form games to see how and whether they extrapolate between similar games. They show that convergence to Nash equilibrium occurs faster if participants have been exposed to a strategically equivalent game before and rationalize the data through Stahl's n-level learning theory. Selten et al. (2003) let subjects submit strategies for tournaments with many different 3 × 3 games and find that the induced fraction of pure strategy Nash equilibria increases over time. Grosskopf et al. (2008) find support for case based decision making as proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) in a monopoly decision problem with limited information.
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Of course there is also some theoretical literature dealing with categorization of decision problems or games. The probably most well known example is case-based decision theory Schmeidler 1995, 1996) .
2 They argue that if agents face a decision problem for the first time they will reason by analogy to similar situations they have faced in the past. They then derive a utility representation for an axiomatization of such a decision rule. The similarity function from case-based decision theory has been applied to games by for example Li Calzi (1995) or Steiner and Stewart (2008) . Jehiel (2005) and Mengel (2008) present concepts where agents partition a given set of games into categories of games they see as analogous.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experimental design and our research questions. In Section 3 we present the results and section 4 concludes.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses
We consider behavior of agents that face many different strategic situations. In particular, agents interact in different games and might not be able to distinguish all of them due to their limited cognitive capacities. Our aim is to gain insights on how behavior in each individual situation is affected by the complexity of the environment (if at all).
An obvious human reaction to complexity is to form categories of situations that are perceived as "similar" or "close" and treat all games in a category in a similar way. It is, however, not obvious, (a) which criteria need to be satisfied to establish the perception of closeness and (b) in what respect games of the same category are treated similarly. Our experiment is designed to yield insights on both issues: (a) We analyze systematically how people categorize games. Possible criteria for choosing categories could be strategic similarity (roughly, games are perceived as close if there is overlap of the supports of their Nash equilibria), or closeness in the payoff space (as measured either through matrix norm of the difference of the payoff matrices or the Hausdorff distance of their convex hulls). 4 Of course categories could also be learned (Mengel, 2008) .
(b) Within those categories subjects could treat games similarly in two respects.
One possibility is belief bundling across games in the same category (e.g. Jehiel, 2005) . A second possibility is action bundling across the games in the same category (e.g. Mengel, 2008 or Steiner and Stewart, 2008) . While under belief bundling agents will have the same beliefs about the opponent's behavior in all the games within a given category, they can still choose different actions in games contained in the same category. This is (by definition) not possible under action bundling. Agents engaging in action bundling need not form beliefs about the opponent at all (e.g. they could be reinforcement learners).
Our experiment is designed to distinguish between those possible categorizations as well as the different forms of similar treatment of games within the same category. We will make no assumptions on how participants "should" categorize games or which games they "should" perceive as similar, but rather try to observe this in our data. Of course, we can also find out whether behavior (or part of it) is random in the sense that it is not guided by any of the above mentioned forces.
The Experimental Design
Let us now provide details on our experimental design. We let 128 participants anonymously interact in different 3 × 3 normal form games for 100 rounds. In all treatments subjects were split up equally in row and column players. They were randomly rematched in each round within groups of eight participants. We ran four treatments in total that differed in (a) the number of different games the subjects were confronted with (either two or six) and (b) how difficult it was (in terms of cognitive effort) to access information on the environment and the opponents' play.
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In all treatments each of the possible games occurred with equal probability in each round. Thus, in the two treatments with few games each of the two possible games occurred with probability 1 2 , while in the treatments with many games, each game occurred with probability 1 6 . The normal form games we chose are given in Note that games 4, 5, and 6 are "copies" of games 1, 2, and 3 (payoffs are monotonically transformed by adding either 5 or 10 to all values). In the two treatments with few games (labeled "F"), subjects played games 1 and 2. In the treatments with many games (labeled "M") subjects played all games shown in table 1 .
Note that all games have a unique strict Nash equilibrium. In games 2 and 5 this Nash equilibrium is in strictly dominant strategies and games 3 and 6 are solvable by iterated strict dominance. In games 1 and 4 elimination of a weakly dominated strategy is needed to reach the unique Nash equilibrium. All games are acyclic (Young, 1993) and the unique strict Nash equilibrium coincides with the maximin prediction. We designed the games in this way so that a) it is easy to learn the Nash equilibrium if the game is the only game played and b) there are no conflicting predictions of existing theories of learning in a single game.
On the other hand, if multiple games are played and if agents form categories, the theoretical prediction will depend on a) which categories agents use and b) whether they engage in belief bundling or action bundling. More precisely our games are designed in such a way that belief bundling will lead to an increase in B (b)-choices in games 1 and 4 if either the coarsest category or category {1,3,4,6} is chosen. Action bundling of games on the other hand predicts an increase in C (b) choices in games 1,3,4 and 6 whenever the coarsest category (including all games) is used and an increase in B (b) choices if category {1,3,4,6} is used. (We focus on these categories since those are the ones we find empirically). In games 2 and 5 both predict Nash choices irrespective of the category used.
We generated games randomly from a uniform distribution. The following table shows how often each game occurred in the treatments with few games (F) and many games (M). Throughout the experiment subjects could only see their own payoffs, but not the payoffs of their match. This is an important feature of our design, since it ensures that participants cannot engage in strategic considerations like eliminating strategies through iterated dominance etc.. The only way they can find out about the opponent's behavior is to learn about it. Hence cognitive complexity in our experiment arises solely from the difficulty of this learning process. 6 We used abstract games rather than e.g. Coordination or Conflict games in order to a) make "second-guessing" of the opponents' payoffs more difficult if not impossible and b) to separate complexity from fairness and other related considerations.
After each round subjects were informed of their interaction partner's choice. In all treatments subjects received exactly the same information, however, in two of them it was harder to extract the relevant information since it required substantial reasoning and memorizing capacities.
In the treatments with high accessibility of information (labeled "I"), payoff matrices for all the games (containing only the participants own payoffs) were printed in the instructions that were distributed at the beginning of the experiment. 7 In each round subjects were, moreover, informed about the average action choices of their past interaction partners in the last five rounds. In the treatments with low accessibility of information, the payoff matrices did not appear in the instructions but were only shown to the subjects for a limited time in each round before the software switched to the decision screen (where the payoffs where not displayed any more). There was also no explicit information given on average action choices of the opponent. However, in principle subjects could extract this information from the information provided to them on the action choice of their match in each round. Subjects were not allowed to take notes throughout the experiment in any of the treatments.
In the following we will label our four treatments as described in Table 3 .
few games many games explicit information FI MI no explicit information F M Table 3 : Treatments.
In all treatments except FI subjects participated in a cognitive reflection test (Fredericks, 2005) immediately after the experiment. We did not provide material incentives for correct answers in the test.
The experiment took place in December 2007 at the Experimental Laboratory in Cologne. All experimental sessions were computerized.
8 Written instructions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment. 9 Sessions lasted between 60min (F) and 90min (M and MI) (including reading the instructions, answering a post-experimental questionnaire and receiving payments). Students earned between 12,90 Euro and 21,50 Euro in the experiment (including the show-up fee of 2.50) On average subjects earned a little more than 18 Euros (all included).
Research Questions
With this experimental design we want to answer the following research questions. First, we are interested in whether agents forms categories of games that they perceive as similar and, if so, how this affects their behavior: Second, we will analyze the dynamics of the learning process:
Q2.1 How do participants learn across games?
Q2.2 Do similarity relations or categories change over time?
Q2.3 Are there differences between participants in how they learn across games?
We will look at three different types of evidence: action choices in the different games, estimated learning models and questionnaire data. In Section 3.1 we start by looking at the action choices of the participants in our experiment allowing us to (partly) address our first set of research questions (Q1.1 -Q1.4). In Section 3.2 then we take a dynamic perspective and try to answer the questions (Q2.1 -Q2.3). In Section 3.3 we will try to relate the behavior of the participants to their score in the cognitive reflection test, allowing us to gain more insights into the last question (Q2.3).
Results
This section contains our experimental results. We start by describing action choices in section 3.1. Later, in section 3.2 we analyze which kind of categorization and analogy thinking could explain the data best.
Action Choices Games 1 and 4
We first consider action choices in Game 1 and Game 4, which are strategically equivalent. Remember that Games 1 and 4 have a unique strict Nash equilibrium which is given by (A,a) and are acyclic (Young, 1993) . Table 4 summarizes the share of A, B and C choices during the last 50 rounds of the experiment separately for row (RP) and column (CP) players and for the two games (Game 1 and Game 4). Table 4 : Share of action choices in game 1 and 4 (last 50 rounds).
As we suspected, treatments with "many" games (M and MI) seem to be more difficult for the players than treatments with few games (F and FI), at least in the sense that the Nash equilibrium action A is chosen less frequently. The share of A−choices is significantly different across all treatments except for F and FI (Mann-Whitney Test, p < 0.0001). This is also illustrated in figures 1 and 2 (here, triangles represent treatments with few games, and hollow symbols stand for no explicit information). The tables also illustrate that choices in Game 4 are not very different from Choices in Game 1 in the last 50 rounds. As expected, thus, agents do learn to "recognize" strategic similarity.
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Remember that models of categorization can rationalize an increase of B(b) or C-choices, but not c-choices. Interestingly those are also the only choices we do not observe at all. . Surprisingly, convergence is slower in treatment FI, where detailed information is being provided. This might be explained by the fact that subjects receive information on their opponents' behavior in the last five rounds, which may slow down convergence.
In treatment M (many games and no explicit information), on the contrary, the distribution of action choices does not seem to converge to equilibrium as figures 3 and 4 illustrate. The figures show how the proportion of A choices in Game 4 evolves for both the row players (denoted "player 1") and the column players ("player 2") in the treatments M (hollow symbols) and MI (black symbols). In treatment MI (many games with explicit information) action choice seems to converge to Nash equilibrium, but convergence is clearly slower as compared to the treatments with few games. 11 In the more complex environment with many games providing explicit information about the opponent's behavior seems necessary for convergence. Without such information a significant number of choices is Non-Nash, possibly because agents rely on information from several games when making their choices. We will come back to this in Section 3.2.
Remember that we designed the games to be acyclic and thus -if learning is not affected by similarity reasoning or other cognitive constraints -participants should converge to Nash equilibrium over time. In fact, the best response to the average 11 This is still true if one takes into account that agents faced game 1 not as often in the treatments with many games as they did face game 1 in the treatments with few games. Note also that, even though game 4 occurred more than twice as often as game 1 in the treatments with many games, average play is not closer to Nash in game 4 than in game 1. behavior of the opponents in the whole population (disregarding the fact that each individual was matched only with a subset of all participants) is action A (a) for row (column) players in treatments FI, F and MI. In treatment M, though, best responses to the actual distribution were given by B (b) for row (column) players respectively, although the expected payoff difference to action A(a) is very small. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that treatment M is also the only treatment where choices do not converge to the Nash prediction.
How are these facts reflected in the average payoffs of our participants? Table 5 contains information on average payoffs in the last 50 rounds of the experiment. We partitioned the participants according to the action they chose most of the time during the experiment. It can be seen that participants choosing predominantly action C obtain substantially lower payoffs on average than all others. The payoff differences between agents choosing predominantly action A(a) or action B(b) are not significant in any of the treatments. The numbers in brackets are standard deviations.
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Result 1 (Action Choices Game 1 and 4)
1. Action choices converge to Nash equilibrium (A,a) in treatments FI, F and MI. Convergence is faster in F than in FI and slow in MI. In treatment M there is no convergence to Nash equilibrium.
2. In treatment M we observe considerably fewer Nash choices and more B resp. b choices than in treatment M I. Action C is chosen in both treatments by some row players, while action c (column players) is not chosen at all. See table 4. In games 2 and 5 both, row and column players, had a strictly dominant strategy (the equilibrium is (C,b)) and -non-surprisingly -they quickly learn to play this strategy. In fact, in none of the treatments and for none of the player roles the overall share of Nash (C,b) choices is below 95%.
Result 2 (Action Choices Game 2 and 5) Action choices quickly converge to Nash equilibrium (C,b) in games 2 and 5 in all treatments.
Games 3 and 6
Games 3 and 6 are solvable by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
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The unique strict Nash equilibrium is (A,b). Table 6 shows the distribution of action choices in games 3 and 6 over the last 50 rounds of the experiment. Table 6 : Share of action choices in game 3 and 6 (last 50 rounds).
13 B is dominated for the row player, and given the row player does not play B, the column player should play b.
Column players choose strategy b almost always. This is plausible since b is a "dominant" strategy if row players do not choose strategy B. However, note that this has to be learned from the row players' behavior since participants did only have information about their own payoffs.
In MI (where it is easy to obtain information about the opponent's play) row players choose the Nash action at least 97% (89%) of the time in game 3(6), but interestingly we observe a lot of C choices (46% and 50%) in treatment M. The share of C−choices is significantly different across the two treatments (Mann-Whitney Test, p < 0.0001). This again points to the fact that the environment in treatment M was too complex for subjects to store and process all the information needed for optimal learning. The strategically equivalent games 3 and 6 are also played in a similar fashion, i.e. the distribution of action choices does not differ substantially between games 3 and 6.
Note that while both belief-bundling and Nash behavior predict A− choices, action bundling predicts an increase in C−choices in games 3 and 6 if agents extrapolate across all games (see also Section 3.2). None of the concepts of analogy reasoning, though, predicts an increase in B (a,c) choices, which are choices that are never observed. Behavior thus seems far from random even in the most complex environment (treatment M) and theories of categorization seem to be able to organize the data.
Even though a substantial fraction of row players choose action C, the best response to the average behavior of column players is clearly to choose action A. This is also reflected in the payoffs (see table 7 ), where those row-players that choose mainly action A earn clearly more than those that choose mainly action C. (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.04712 in Game 3 and p < 0.0001 in Game 6) This suggests that C−choices might be due to the fact that agents choosing mainly C are less willing to engage in costly cognitive reflection and hence use coarser partitions. We will provide some evidence for this in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 3. Action Choices in Game 3 are not significantly different from Action Choices in Game 6.
Summary
A first conclusion that we can draw from the descriptive evidence is that (at least for the simple games we chose) participants on average learn to treat strategically equivalent games in the same way. Below we will see that this is also a good description of individual behavior. 70% (80%) of all participants in treatment M (MI) display the same choice behavior in all games that are strategically equivalent. We have also seen, though, that -unless games have a dominant strategy -participants seem to have different ideas about what the optimal action choice is in each pair of strategically equivalent games. This is most striking in games 3 and 6, where in spite of the fact that the column players choose b almost all of the time, some row players think that A is the best choice in these games while others believe that C is the best choice. In addition those participants who choose mainly action C in these games earn clearly lower payoffs due to the fact that C is not a best response to the column players' actions in these games. Also note that the variance is weakly higher for payoffs associated with C choices rather than A choices. Also in games 1 and 4 players seem to have different ideas about optimal choices at least in treatment M. As the share of suboptimal responses declines drastically from M to MI, it seems unlikely that participants have some kind of "psychological" preference for the suboptimal Figure 6 : Share of Action A in Game 6 (Player 1) over time actions. Rather, it seems a reasonable conjecture that these suboptimal choices must have to do with cognitive constraints. In the next section we will study how participants might learn across the different games and whether models of categorization can explain the data well.
Before we do this, though, we will have a quick look at whether it is the same participants that play (or deviate from) the Nash action in the different games. To these ends we again partition the set of all participants according to the action they chose most of the time in a given game. We do this analysis for treatment M, where we observe most deviations from Nash equilibrium. In this treatment six out of 32 participants choose the Nash equilibrium action most of the time in all games 1 − 6. All others deviate from Nash (most of the time) in at least one of the games. Out of those that deviate in at least one game seven row players choose action C in both games 3 and 6, three (two) row players choose action B(C) most of the time in games 1 and 4 and six column players choose action B most of the time in games 1 and 4. 22 participants choose the same action most of the time in all strategically equivalent games. Two participants play both games 3 and 6 as well as 1 and 4 differently, while eight play only games 1 and 4 differently.
We also checked whether subjects that deviate from Nash equilibrium do still get significantly higher payoffs than someone choosing actions uniformly at random. Such a (row) player would obtain an average payoff of 18.6 across all games, whereas the average payoff across all games of those that deviated from the Nash action most of the time in a given game was given by 23.3. A t−test indicates that this average payoff is significantly different from 18.6 (p < 0.0001).
14 We can conclude that even though some subjects behave suboptimally (possibly due to cognitive constraints) their behavior is still much better than that of a "random" player.
Categorization and Learning Dynamics
In this section we analyze which categories best explain the observed action choices. We moreover investigate whether different "types" of participants (choosing different actions) follow different learning rules. To these ends we estimate two different learning models (a reinforcement learning model and a belief-based model) under different assumptions on the categories that players use and then apply the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to evaluate model accuracy.
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More precisely we assume that players are endowed with propensities (or scores) with which they evaluate the different actions. These propensities are updated differently depending on which categorizations the agents hold and on whether they rely on belief-based or reinforcement learning. Finally there will be a choice rule that chooses actions as a function of their propensities.
16 Denote the propensities of player i by
for the three actions A, B and C and let the payoff of player i in round t be denoted by π it . Denote the category employed by player i by g i ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Under the reinforcement learning rule (see e.g. Roth and Erev, 1995) , if at time t game γ occurs and agent i chooses action m ∈ {A, B, C}, propensities are updated as follows:
where δ ∈ (0, 1). 17 Another model we investigate is belief-based learning as proposed by Sarin and Vahid (1999) . According to this rule propensities are updated as follows:
The difference between these two updating rules is in how actions (or analogy classes) not used are treated. The second rule is typically interpreted as a beliefbased rule, as the value of α m (g) is an estimate of the average payoff of action m in the games contained in category g. In contrast, under the first rule the propensities of action/category pairs, that have not been used for some time decrease with a factor (1−δ). The α m (g) in this case cannot be interpreted as beliefs, but rather incorporates a much wider set of positive feelings about an action, as well as notions of forgetting 15 The Akaike criterion is given by LL-k where LL is the log-likelihood and k the number of free parameters of the model. For small sample sizes sometimes the corrected Akaike criterium is used (See Burnham and Anderson, 2002) . Since all our competing models have the same number of free parameters we can essentially evaluate them through the log-likelihood. 16 See e.g. Camerer and Ho (1999), Rustichini (1999) , or Hopkins (2002 Hopkins ( , 2007 . 17 See also Mengel (2008) .
or confirmatory bias. This is why this rule is typically given the interpretation of a reinforcement or stimulus response rule. 18 Note that under either rule experience of payoffs from action m impacts propensities in all games belonging to the same category g but not in games outside category g.
We are not so much interested now in distinguishing between these two learning models, but rather we want to use them as a workhorse for analyzing which categorizations explain behavior best. Our estimation strategy is the following. We will estimate the probability of choosing a particular action in a particular game under both learning models and under all possible assumptions on the categories used by the agents. We will then evaluate model accuracy (of all these different models) by using the Akaike information criterion. Since we are interested in whether different action choices of agents are due to different categories the agents hold, we estimate the probability of choosing a given action, i.e.
Pr(a(t) =
We then check whether different categories explain behavior best for different action choices. We restrict attention to the last 50 periods of the experiment, where behavior has stabilized. The regression tables for the "best" regressions are provided in the appendix.
Our model has several free parameters. We assume four different values for δ ∈ {0.05, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8} and different initial conditions for (α i0 A , α i0 B , α i0 C ). In particular we set initial conditions to either the zero vector or proportional to first round choice (summing to 40). We then estimate all possible combinations of these values and the different categories and learning models and use the Akaike information criterium to select among all models.
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First we note that our "best" learning models are able to explain the data remarkably well. Especially for the suboptimal choices B and C the value of ρ is between 0.35 and 0.46 in all regressions. 20 In the following tables we summarize our main findings regarding the "best" partitions. We restrict attention to row players, since column players have a dominant strategy in all games except 1 and 4.
"Best" Categories
The table illustrates the "best partition" (according to the Akaike criterium) for each of the action choices and games. It also shows which model (the belief-based model or the reinforcement model) explained the data better, and which value of δ. The "best" (Remember also that we focus on the last 50 periods). For some regressions (e.g. A-choices in game 1) no significant learning can be singled out by our regressions. Some regressions did not produce enough variation to yield significant results. This is especially true for choices that were observed very little. First, observe that strategically equivalent games are always found in the same category. The most clear-cut results are obtained in games 3 and 6. Remember that in these games column players almost always choose strategy b and learning thus might be "easier". Nash choices (A) are always best explained through category {3, 6}, whereas Non-Nash choices (C) are best explained through the bigger categories {1, 3, 4, 6} or even {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. In fact, for games 3 and 6 these two categories are very close in terms of the Akaike information criterium. As we stated in section 2.2 (and prove in the appendix), a model of action bundling predicts choosing C in these games for category {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Belief bundling cannot explain C−choices in these games. Also the fact that reinforcement learning explains the data best is consistent with the hypothesis that action bundling led to the observed C-choices. A−choices in category {3, 6} are predicted by both models (action and belief-bundling).
In games 1 and 4 B-choices are best explained by category {1, 3, 4, 6}. Belief bundling predicts B−choices given category {1, 3, 4, 6}, but also action bundling predicts B−choices if historical frequencies are used (see again section 2.2 and the appendix). The only somewhat puzzling result is that A−choices in Game 4 seem to be explained through bigger categories than B−choices. We will come back to this below.
Note also that table 8 does not answer our research question completely. We would like to know whether our results actually reflect the fact that there are different "player types", each holding consistent categories. Thus, we repeat the previous exercise, but now focusing on agents that choose action A, B or C the majority of the time. Table  9 reports the results.
Game1 Game4
Game3 Table 9 : For agents that choose mainly A (B, C): "Best" partitions for each action choice and game, "best" model according to the AIC (BB=Belief Based, RF=Reinforcement), and shares of the corresponding choices (in brackets).
Now the puzzling result in Game 4 disappears. Among those agents that mainly choose action A the finest category {4} indeed explains the data best. All other results stay essentially unchanged, which makes us confident that indeed our results observed in Section 3.1 can be explained well by models of categorization. Lastly the fact that the best δ is somewhat lower in games 3 and 6 could indicate that in these games behavior has converged faster than in the other games.
In order to know whether similarity relations evolve over time we repeated the exercise by focusing on the first 33 rounds of the experiment. Here we find that (in almost all cases) the coarsest category explains the data best, suggesting that categories are indeed "learned" over time.
Result 4 (Categorization and Action Choices)
1. Nash choices (A in games 1,3,4 and 6) are best explained through smaller categories than non-Nash choices.
2. B choices in games 1 and 4 can be rationalized through models of belief bundling or action bundling given the "best" category.
3. C choices in games 3 and 6 can be rationalized through models of action bundling given the "best" categories.
Population Heterogeneity
While our results can be explained well by models of categorization with either action or belief-bundling, still a somewhat puzzling feature remains. After all we would like to think that agents hold a number of categories and choose consistently with this categorization (and a model of either belief-bundling or action bundling) in all games. No problem arises in this respect with A−choices. But with respect to the Non-Nash choices the picture is a little less clear. For example, if an agent holds category {1, 3, 4, 6} and engages in action bundling she should choose the same action (either A or B) in all games 1, 3, 4 and 6. On the other hand if an agent engages in belief-bundling she should choose action B in games 1 and 4 and action A in games 3 and 6, but never action C.
Non-Transitivity of Categorizations
A first explanation would be that agents choosing Non-Nash actions use the biggest category for their decisions in games 3 and 6, i.e. extrapolate from all games in games 3 and 6 but hold the smaller category {1, 3, 4, 6} for decisions in games 1 and 4. If we furthermore assume that agents engage in action bundling this could explain the results, but we would have to accept that categorizations are not partitions and in particular are neither transitive nor symmetric. A more convincing explanation is maybe to maintain the partition structure of categorizations and rely exclusively on heterogeneity in the population to explain the results.
Population Heterogeneity w.r.t. categories
The minimal degree of heterogeneity needed is to assume that roughly 50% of both row and column players hold the biggest category and 50% hold partition {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 6}}. Assume also that all players engage in action bundling. 21 Column players holding the biggest category should then choose action b in all games (since it is dominant strategy given this category). Row players holding this category should choose either action C or action A (see appendix).
22 Column players holding categorization {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 6}} should choose a in {1, 4} and b in the remaining categories. Row players on the other hand holding categorization {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 6}} should choose A in {3, 6}, but might choose either A or B in category {1, 4}, since both actions are best responses to column players choosing b. An alternative explanation could also be to split the latter group into two groups where one holds categorization {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 6}} and one holds {{1, 3, 4, 6}, {2, 5}}. The heterogenous population explanation is consistent with the evidence presented in Section 3.3 (see below).
Cognitive Reflection Test
Since the aim of the paper was to investigate decisions in the presence of cognitive constraints, it is natural to expect that the willingness of subjects to engage in cognitively costly reasoning processes should be correlated with their behavior in the different games. To these ends we conducted a cognitive reflection test at the end of the experiment (Fredericks, 2005) . The test consists of the three following questions 1. A bat and a ball cost Euro 1.10 in total. The bat costs Euro 1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
All these questions have an answer that immediately springs into mind (10 cents, 100 minutes, 24 days), which is wrong. The right answer (5 cents, 5min, 47 days) can only be found by engaging in some cognitive reflection. Note that the test is not measuring intelligence, but rather the willingness of subjects to engage in costly cognitive reflection. In our experiment cognitive reflection is mostly required to memorize past payoffs and the past behavior of the opponents in previous games. (Remember that since participants can only see their own payoffs, cognitive reflection here cannot be about the ability to perform iterated elimination of dominated strategies etc...)
We now report some results on the relation of the individuals' CRT scores and their choice behavior in our experiment. In the next table we report the action choices in games 1,3,4 and 6 in treatment M separately for those subjects who got all three questions right and for those that did not. Getting all three questions right implies a very high willigness to engage in costly cognitive reflection. Hence we will refer to these subjects as "very reflective".
Focus first on games 3 and 6. Here it can be seen that very reflective subjects choose C a lot less than the best response action A, whereas for all other subjects Table 11 : Action choice of reflective and unreflective individuals in treatment M.
this difference is reversed. (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.0001). Their higher willingness to engage in costly cognitive reflection seems to make them willing to use finer categories than other agents. It is also interesting that the reflective subjects choose the suboptimal action C (which yields a lot lower payoff given the choices of others) a lot less in games 1 and 4. There seem to be no significant differences between the proportions of A and B choices in these games. If anything the very reflective agents tend to use action B more often in those games. This is consistent with the heterogenous population explanation given above. Note also that the results are again extremely similar in games 1 and 4 and games 3 and 6 respectively. We can summarize as follows.
Result 5 (Cognitive Reflection Test) Row Players that are most willing to engage in costly cognitive reflection choose Action C significantly less often in all games 1, 3, 4, and 6 than other row players.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated experimentally how agents learn to make decisions in a multiple games environment. Participants interacted in simple 3 × 3 normal form games for 100 rounds. We varied the number of games across treatments. In addition in some treatments we provided explicit information about the opponent's past behavior. We find that participants do extrapolate between games. If either there are few games or if explicit information about the opponent's behavior is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case and play converges to a distribution of actions which is Non-Nash. Action choices, though, that cannot be explained by theoretical models of either belief-bundling or action bundling are never observed. Estimating both belief-based and reinforcement learning models using different partitions we find that Nash choices are best explained by finer categorizations than Non-Nash choices. Furthermore participants scoring better in the "Cognitive Reflection Test" choose Nash actions more often than other participants.
Action Bundling
Consider the average game created through category {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Denote by f i the frequency of game i. Then payoffs for the row player in the average game can be computed as follows: a b c A 20 (f 1 + f 6 ) + 5f 2 + 15f 3 + 25f 4 If agents engage in action bundling and play according to the average game we should observe an increase in C choices for row players and an increase of b−choices for column players, since both are dominant strategies given this average game. This continues to be true if historical frequencies from the first 50 rounds are used instead of uniform frequencies, but in this case action C ceases to be a dominant strategy for row players (also A choices are rationalizable), while b is still the dominant strategy for column players. It can be seen easily that action c is dominated and should thus never be observed. The predicted outcome is an increase in b−choices by column players compared to the Nash benchmark. 23 . Using these frequencies thus action bundling predicts an increase also in B−choices by row players whenever at least 2 3 of column players choose b. 24 
Belief Bundling
Under belief bundling agents form average beliefs but then best respond to these average beliefs in each game separately.
In category {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, since choosing b is a dominant strategy in games 2 and 5 and results from iterated elimination of dominated strategies in games 3 and 6, row players must attach belief at least 2 3 to the column player choosing b (and probability zero to c). But then B is a best response to any such belief in games 1 and 4. Given that row players choose B in these games (i.e. with frequency 1 3 ), C in games 2 and 5 (frequency 1 3 ) and A in games 3 and 6 (frequency In category {1, 3, 4, 6} again b is a dominant strategy for column players in games 3 and 6 (after eliminating B) and consequently must receive at least probability 1 2 . But then again B is a best response for row players in games 1 and 4. Given that row players choose B with probability 1 2 and A with probability 1 2 (games 3 and 6) column players will best respond with A in games 1 and 4 leading. Belief-bundling predicts an increase in B choices in games 1 and 4 in these games. Tables: Best Partitions in If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to you and answer your question. From now on you must not communicate with any other participant in the experiment. You are not allowed to use pencils, nor to use any paper other than these instructions. If you do not conform with these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone now.
Regression
You will receive 2,50 e just for showing up to the experiment. During the course of the experiment you can earn more money. How much you will earn depends on your behavior as well as on the behavior of the other participants. During the experiment all money amounts are being calculated ECU (Experimental Currency Units) which will be converted into Euros according to the exchange rate 1e = 130 ECU at the end of the experiment. All your decisions will be treated confidentially.
The Experiment
The experiment consists of 100 rounds. In each round you will play one of several possible games with a randomly selected interaction partner. At the beginning of each round, your interaction partner is randomly determined. This random selection of your interaction partner takes places in each period irrespective of the previous periods. You cannot identify the other participants and hence you cannot know, whether you have interacted with your current interaction partner before. As a consequence also all of your decisions will remain anonymous for the other participants.
Which game you will play in any given round is determined randomly. At the beginning of each round you will be informed about which game is currently played and the payoffs associated to this game.
In each game you can choose one of three possible actions, action A, B or C. Your payment in each round depends on your action and the action your interaction partner has chosen. Your overall payment at the end of the experiment is the sum of all payoffs that you have earned in each round additionally to the show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
Summary
During the experiment you will be shown payoff tables for each game that is being chosen in a certain round. We will explain in the following how to read such a payoff table.
Game...
Your interaction partner chooses
In the table your actions and the corresponding payments are given in red and the possible actions of your interaction partner are given in blue. Your payment follows from this table as follows.
• If you choose A and your interaction partner chose a, you will receive 1 ECU.
(upper left entry)
• If you choose B and your interaction partner chose a, you will receive 4 ECU.
(middle left entry)
• If you choose C and your interaction partner chose a, you will receive 7 ECU.
(lower left entry)
• If you choose A and your interaction partner chose b, you will receive 2 ECU.
(upper middle entry)
• If you choose B and your interaction partner chose b, you will receive 5 ECU.
(middle entry)
• If you choose C and your interaction partner chose b, you will receive 8 ECU.
(lower middle entry)
• If you choose A and your interaction partner chose c, you will receive 3 ECU.
(upper right entry)
• If you choose B and your interaction partner chose c, you will receive 6 ECU.
(middle right entry)
• If you choose C and your interaction partner chose c, you will receive 9 ECU. (lower right entry)
In the upper left corner you can see to which game the table belongs. The payments shown in this table are an example and will not appear in the experiment.
